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I. INTRODUCTION
At a faculty lunch a couple of years ago, one of us, a teacher of Property and a
student of metaphor and the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, heard the other, a scholar
specializing in intellectual property, describe a paper about “things.”1 Conversations
ensued, drafts were exchanged, comments were discussed, and a productive dialogue
emerged. That dialogue has matured into this Comment. It seems altogether fitting
that our discussion is honed and framed by the work of Margaret Jane Radin, whose
signal work on commodification and objectification in law has proved so thoughtprovoking.
We begin in considerable sympathy with Radin’s relational approach to property.
In somewhat differing ways, we each relate this relational approach to its beginnings
in metaphor and the central organizing value that metaphor has in producing
knowledge. We take our cue from Radin’s work, but like others, we intend to take
the commodification/objectification inquiry in some new directions, exploring both
the ongoing potential of metaphor to illuminate both questions of theory and
doctrine, and how various ways of thinking about commodification and
objectification can—in the words of Radin’s contribution to this Symposium—help
us to situate the “neighborhood” of property law in a city of diverse and
interdependent communities.2
As its two main Parts will evidence, this Comment remains the product of two
distinct if overlapping voices. Part II returns to the conceptual origins of Radin’s
theory in her general critique of objectification and commodification. It asks
*
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1

Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, CASE W.
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Madison, Law as Design].
2

Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV.23 (2006) [hereinafter Radin, Information Propertization].

141

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

142

[Vol. 54:141

whether a more positive concept of objectification can be recovered that is
distinguishable from reification, the latter seeming to be the more appropriate locus
of Radin’s criticism. Part III’s response to Radin is similar, but it tries to exemplify
both our appreciation of and our differences from her work through more detailed
analysis of intellectual property law and theory.
II. OBJECTIFICATION VERSUS REIFICATION
As her article in this Symposium aptly confirms,3 Margaret Radin has contributed
significantly to a relational view of property. We derive from this relational
approach two larger themes. First, within the legal neighborhood of propertization,4
the character of an item as property is not determined by the item in isolation but in
weighing and balancing the relations between those who assert to control it and those
who seek to freely use it.5 Further, this balancing is reassessed in its relation to new
points of application.6 Second and correlatively, propertized items are never simply
brute facts whose legal character derives from this facticity. Instead, their “facticity”
is intertwined with their legal character, with the policy judgment that balances the
interests at stake. As Radin writes, “[F]acts are not ‘out there’ waiting to be
described by a discourse. Facts are theory-dependent and value-dependent.”7 The
relational nature of property and its interrelation of fact and theory are especially
evident in the changes to property doctrine over time as it is applied to changing
circumstances.8 As Radin discusses9 and as we shall later probe at greater length,10
this is particularly apparent as the law attempts to deal with new forms of digital
information. Old categories are breaking down, and a reconceptualization appears to
be in progress.11
We want to support and deepen Radin’s analysis here by drawing upon the
insights of philosopher Paul Ricoeur. As to the interrelation of theory and fact,
Ricoeur affirms that it is impossible to separate the two: a “fact” is always
interwoven with our conceptualization of it. “The so-called ‘real’ process [of human
life and activity],” Ricoeur maintains, “already has a symbolic dimension. . . . [A]
3

See id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 25-27; see also CAROL M. ROSE, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 27-28 (1994)
[hereinafter ROSE, Property as Storytelling] (“We often think of property as some version of
entitlement to things: I have a right to this thing or that. In a more sophisticated version of
property, of course, we see property as a way of defining our relationships with other
people.”).
6

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509
(1996) [hereinafter Radin, Property Evolving].
7

MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 89 (1996).

8

Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 26

9

See, e.g., Radin, Property Evolving, supra note 6.

10
11

See discussion infra Part III.

Margaret Jane Radin, Information Tangibility, in ECONOMICS, LAW AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 395, 405 (Ove Granstrand ed., 2003).
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presymbolic . . . stage of real life can nowhere be found. Symbolism in general is
not a secondary effect of social real life; it constitutes real life as socially
meaningful. . . . . [T]he symbolic function is originary . . . .”12 Elsewhere Ricoeur
insists that “symbolic systems belong already to the infrastructure, to the basic
constitution of human being.”13 Human life is symbolically mediated; it is caught in
an inextricable interpretive web; fact cannot be separated from symbolization.
A second insight we draw from Ricoeur by way of his heremeneutic predecessor,
Hans-Georg Gadamer. This point deepens Radin’s argument that property doctrine
changes as it is applied in new contexts. Gadamer famously contends that meaning
and application are interrelated: the meaning of a principle is not determined at the
outset for all time but changes as it is applied in new circumstances. As Gadamer
argues, application involves “co-determining, supplementing, and correcting [a]
principle.”14 Commentator Joel Weinsheimer clarifies that this means that neither
the interpretive rule “nor the instance to which it is applied is antecedent to the
other”; their relationship is “reciprocal rather than unilateral. Each term modifies
and acts on the other so that they interact.”15 We emphasize here the relational
nature of meaning: at the point of application, existing categorization may be broken
and reformed. Following Ricoeur, we also characterize the nature of meaning here
as metaphoric. Metaphor violates a current order; it transgresses the given order.16
The new circumstance cannot be accommodated without change and so disrupts
existing doctrine or principles. Metaphor does not just disorder, though; the process
of metaphoric as-similation leads to the creation of a new ordering, a transfiguration
of prior doctrine or principles.17 The relational nature of this metaphoric operation
deserves emphasis: metaphor involves not just a word “whose meaning is displaced,
but the pair of terms or relationships between which the transposition operates.”18
Ricoeur underscores how basic this metaphoric operation may be:
12

Paul Ricoeur, Can There be a Scientific Concept of Ideology?, in PHENOMENOLOGY AND
44, 51 (Joseph Bien ed., 1978).

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
13

PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 258 (George H. Taylor ed., 1986)
[hereinafter RICOEUR, LECTURES]. The reference to the symbolic as infrastructural here is an
explicit challenge to Marxian orthodoxy where the infrastructure – the basic activity of human
life – is economic and the symbolic or ideational (which would include law) is merely
superstructural, that is, derivative from the economic. See id. at 153-54.
14
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 39 (1992).
primary exemplification of this interrelation. See id. at 324-41.

For Gadamer, law is a

15
JOEL WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY 80 (1991);
see also JOEL WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND
METHOD 192 (1985) (“[T]he general is . . . continually determined by the particular, even as it
determines the particular. Application is not reductive but productive . . . .”).
16

See PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR 21-22 (Robert Czerny trans., 1977)
[hereinafter RICOEUR, METAPHOR]. This characterization of metaphor as disruptive is quite
different from other contemporary theories that emphasize the continuity of metaphor from
source to target domain. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE
FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999).
17

RICOEUR, METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 22.

18

Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted).
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[C]ould we not imagine that the process that disturbs and displaces a
certain logical order, a certain conceptual hierarchy, a certain
classification scheme, is the same as that from which all classification
proceeds? . . . [C]ould we not imagine that the order itself is born in the
same way that it changes? Is there not, in Gadamer’s terms, a
‘metaphoric’ at work at the origin of logical thought, at the root of all
classification? . . . The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse destroys
the[] oppositions between proper and figurative, ordinary and strange,
order and transgression. It suggests the idea that order itself proceeds
from the metaphorical constitution of semantic fields, which themselves
give rise to genus and species.19
The literal exists within the wider and deeper context of metaphor. The literal is not
originary but simply current or usual meaning,20 meaning that can be transformed by
metaphoric means in the application to new circumstances.
We would join the symbolic mediation of life discussed earlier with the
categorial priority granted metaphor here. Both are elements of a larger metaphoric:
facts do not exist independent of theorization or conceptualization; categorization
rests upon a metaphoric impulse. Radin seems to agree: “In one sense, there cannot
be any sharp divide between the literal and the metaphorical, because there is no
sharp divide between action and discourse—between the nature of a transaction and
the conceptual scheme or discursive framework in which we understand it.”21
Metaphor is originary, inextricable, and relational. Recognition of the originary role
played by metaphor in conceptualization and categorization, we argue, provides
more substantial support for a relational theory of property.
Thus far, our argument has been consistent with Radin’s. There is a side of
Ricoeur’s analysis of interpretation other than the metaphoric, however, and
elucidation of that perspective will start to move us away from Radin. Having
established the common grounds between us and Radin, we can now begin to
demarcate our differences, a project that will consume the remainder of our
Comment.
Ricoeur argues that interpretation “functions at the intersection of two domains,
metaphorical and speculative.”22 Speculative discourse establishes the principles

19
Id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted) (citing HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WARHHEIT UND
METHODE 71, 406ff (1960) [GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 14, at 75, 429 ff]);
see also id. at 24, 197-98.
20

Id. at 290-91. This conception of the literal as the usual allows reconciliation of
Ricoeur’s approach with Wittgenstein’s claim that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is
not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going
against it’ in actual cases.” LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS pt.I, ¶
201 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968). Grasping a rule is not an interpretation to the
extent that the usual use of the rule is available rather than needing to be transformed at the
point of application. For application of Wittgenstein’s approach to law, see FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991).
21

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 2; see also ROSE, PROPERTY
PERSUASION, supra note 5, at 296 (“[S]eeing property is an act of imagination”).
22

RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 303.
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“that articulate primordially the space of the concept.”23 Whereas the metaphorical
domain allows meaning to proliferate at new points of application, speculative
discourse is reductive, elucidative; it tries to bring order, establish univocity, derive a
concept.24 Ricoeur aspires to establish an interpretive method responsive to the
interplay between the two domains. He seeks, he says, “a hermeneutic style where
interpretation would conform both to the notion of concept and to that of the
constitutive intention of the experience seeking to be expressed in the metaphorical
mode.”25 In his view, then, interpretation is a “composite discourse” that feels “the
opposite pull of two rival demands”: the pull on one side toward the concept, the
pull on the other of metaphor that “hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that
the concept holds and pins down.”26
The question we would like to pursue is whether property interpretation—in
particular, intellectual property interpretation—can maintain a “composite discourse”
responsive to both the metaphoric dynamism of meaning and the conceptual and
doctrinal drive toward univocity. We argue that although Radin is certainly attentive
to doctrinal needs, her own relational approach to property may weigh too heavily
towards the side of metaphor. In particular, while Radin’s work is noteworthy and
laudable in its efforts to protect personhood—a dynamic of personal meaning—she
mistakenly, in our view, maintains that the objectification of personhood or its
commodification (a subcategory of the former) leads to personhood’s elimination.
We endeavor to show that objectification—whether of person or of doctrine—is not
only inevitable but potentially positive. In this analysis, objectification stands for the
conceptual side of interpretation’s composite discourse. In Part III, we turn to
intellectual property theory and offer considerable doctrinal development of how
treatment of property as thing or object can at the same time preserve the dynamism
of meaning on the metaphorical side of interpretation.
Radin is perhaps best known for her argument that certain qualities of
personhood should be inalienable in the economic market; to be preserved, they must
be protected from market exchange and therefore not be commodified.27 Radin
originally derived her conception of commodification in significant part from
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.28 Our own recontextualization of the perspective
offered by Radin can be situated by a return to this text. It is not that Radin’s own
23

Id. at 300.

24

Id. at 302. In the present context, then, we might describe Radin’s original conceptions
of commodification as more metaphoric—the promulgation of a new way of thinking—and
the second generation of commodification scholarship as one more of speculative discourse,
an attempt to think through more critically and analytically what commodification entails.
This differentiation is, of course, a generalization and is not intended to demean the analytic
power of Radin’s argument or the creative, metaphoric side of the new scholarship.
25

Id. at 303.

26

Id.

27

See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 16-29.

28

See, e.g., id. at 35-40 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. M.
Knox trans., 1952)). Radin’s earlier work on personhood also draws upon as it differentiates
itself from this same text. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 4448 (1993).
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conception rises or falls to the degree it adheres to Hegel; the rigor and depth of her
ideas must be assessed on their own terms. But a return to the Philosophy of Right
provides a useful entrance to our theme, because more seems relevantly at work in
the text than Radin appeared to suppose. In paragraph 43, Hegel asks whether the
attainments of the artist, scholar, or preacher—their “art, erudition, ability to preach
a sermon,” etc.—are “things.”
We may hesitate to call such abilities, attainments, aptitudes, &c.,
“things”, for while possession of these may be the subject of business
dealings and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something
inward and mental about it . . . . Attainments, erudition, talents, and so
forth, are, of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and
not external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody them in
something external and alienate them . . . and in this way they are put into
the category of “things.”29
We would emphasize in this passage a differentiation between externalization and
alienation. As the translator quotes Hegel in a subsequent footnote, “‘Alienation is
giving up something which is my property and which is already external, it is not to
externalize.”’30 The alienation of property places it into the market, and Radin builds
on this in her conception of commodification. In the extended passage above, it is
instructive that Hegel is attentive to that which is internal and “owned by free
mind”—qualities of personhood that are Radin’s concern—but he does not view
alienation of these qualities as inherently destructive of them.
We comprehend Hegel’s larger themes in the Philosophy of Right if we
characterize alienation as a subcategory of externalization. We want to emphasize
the role externalization plays in Hegel’s analysis, a theme that Radin does not seem
sufficiently to attend. For Hegel, externalization is something positive. As the
examples of the scholar, artist, and preacher suggest, their will and person are made
manifest in externalizations of themselves in their work. Their art, scholarship, and
preaching are externalizations or embodiments of themselves. Who we are inwardly
needs to be externalized, needs to be expressed outwardly. The embodiment of the
will is “an immediate external thing.”31 We must translate our freedom into an

29

G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 43 (T. M. Knox trans., 1952)
(emphasis added). We do not include in this quotation sections where Hegel seems to equate
characterization of something as a “thing” with it having legal status, as the subject of
contracts and so on. We return later to criticize this equation: just because something is
characterized as a “thing” does not tell us necessarily anything about how it should be
conceived legally.
That remains an interpretive policy judgment.
See infra text
accompanying notes 124-25. It is also unclear from Hegel’s passage whether something
becomes a “thing” because it is externalized or because it is alienated. As we shall discuss,
see infra text accompanying notes 31-33, 45-46, we more expansively interpret a “thing” as
the product of externalization.
30

Id. at 322 n.16 (citation omitted).

31

Id. ¶ 33.

2006]

METAPHOR, OBJECTS, AND COMMODITIES

147

“external sphere.”32 The interior self becomes realized or actualized by the process
of externalization.33
By contrast, Radin reads the relation between will and external sphere not as a
manifestation of the will in the production of the external but only as the imposition
of the will on a pre-existent external world.34 For instance, Radin emphasizes
Hegel’s pronouncement that an individual can alienate—that is, let go of or transfer
to another—only a “thing external by nature.”35 While Radin views this category as
that of pre-existent natural things,36 we understand it to exclude only those personal
attributes that cannot be alienated, such as one’s ethical life or religion.37 Radin
concludes that “only objects separate from the self are suitable for alienation,”38 and
this leads, she argues, to an untenable distinction between subject and object,
between something internal to the person and an external thing—property—that can
be manipulated and controlled.39 Radin does allow at a couple points that Hegel
provides that mental creations are “capable of objectification by being
externalized,”40 but this does not lead her to revise her larger assessment of Hegel.
As we shall later discuss, this will have unfortunate repercussions in her discussions
of, for example, intellectual property. While Radin acknowledges that mental
products can be externalized and hence are “propertizable,” they are still, she insists,
not things “external by nature.” Radin continues: “The picture of intellectual
property as an external object becomes more problematic every day, as intellectual
property comes to exist in a digital world and is not embodied in any objects we can
point to.”41 As we shall argue, the more positive assessment Hegel provides of the
externalization of the self into created objects permits a recasting of this problem.
The positive characterization of externalization found in Hegel is also available
in the young Marx. Marx goes beyond Hegel in criticizing the alienation of one’s
labor to the extent that the process and product of labor are not matters of selfexpression but rather imposed on the laborer from outside.42 Our more customary
32
Id. ¶ 41 (“A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as
Idea.”).
33

See RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 13, at 38-39 (describing the Hegelian approach).

34

See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 45 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL,
supra note 29, ¶ 41).
35

Id. at 195 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 65); RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 65)
36

See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35-37.

37

See G.W.F. HEGEL, supra note 29, ¶ 66. These attributes are also discussed by Radin,
but she does not draw the same conclusions as do we. See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 35-36.
38

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 34.

39

See id.; Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 397.

40

Radin, Property Evolving, supra note 6, at 511.

41

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 38.

42

See, e.g., KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 111
(Dirk J. Struik ed., 1964) [hereinafter MARX, MANUSCRIPTS].
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contemporary sense of the term alienated labor derives from this understanding.
Under these conditions, says Marx, “[l]abor produces not only commodities: it
produces itself and the worker as a commodity. . . .”43 When Radin discusses Marx
as someone totally opposed to commodification,44 this is the Marx to whom she is
referring. This process of externalization is negative because alien. Yet Marx also
wants to retain a positive concept of externalization, a process that he calls
“objectification.” The proper rather than alienated object of labor is “the
objectification of man’s species life.”45 As Marx comments in another passage,
“[l]abor’s realization is its objectification.”46
This productive capacity of
externalization is positive: “[i]t is life-engendering life.”47 This positive capacity of
externalization is similar to that in Hegel. For the early Marx, writes Ricoeur,
“humanity produces itself . . . by objectifying itself.”48 It may be that this possibility
of objectification will become known historically only after the alienation of labor is
eliminated, but, Ricoeur observes, “it is on the assumption of the abolition of
estrangement that the fundamental concept of objectification is revealed.”49
Radin addresses the alienating form of labor that Marx described.50 “Alienation
comes about,” she writes, “when attributes of personhood are sundered.”51 For her,
objectification describes this negative treatment, where people are treated as means
not ends; attributes of the person become objects—commodities—that may be
purchased or sold in the economic market.52 Because the person is conceived simply
as an element of market exchange, commodification reduces the person as subject to
a thing, an object.53 Throughout her work, Radin admirably wants to analyze how to
43

Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted).

44

See RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at xiii (asserting that Marx’s theory
represents the pole of “universal noncommodification”).
45

MARX, MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 42, at 114 (emphasis omitted).

46

Id. at 108. He goes on to say that now “[i]n the sphere of political economy this
realization of labor appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as the loss of
the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation.” Id. (emphasis
omitted).
47

Id. at 113.

48

See RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 13, at 44.

49

Id. at 60-61. As over time in his work Marx moves increasingly to invert Hegel’s
idealism and maintain a more materialist stance, he nevertheless retains a positive, productive
sense of human externalization. Ricoeur argues, for instance, that the concept of self-activity
discussed in The German Ideology, see, e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN
IDEOLOGY 92 (C. J. Arthur ed., 1970), preserves from earlier writing “something of the
concept of objectification, the self-creation of human being.” RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note
13, at 99.
50

See, e.g., RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 192-93; RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 80.
51

RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 193.

52

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 156.

53

Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of
Commodification, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
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preserve human personhood from this reduction.54 Radin does not argue that marketexchange is inevitably wrong,55 and “incomplete commodification” allows that an
action can both preserve personhood and also enter the market to a degree.56 She
also finds available positive notions of work, although they do not derive from Marx.
On the one hand, she regards as valuable “the freedom to fuse oneself by one’s
efforts with the external environment.”57 Note, though, that this is an operation of
the self on a pre-existing object, not the externalization that creates an object. On the
other hand, she does differentiate between (negative) labor and (positive) work:
“Laborers play [musical] notes, we might say, and workers play the music. . . .
Money does not . . . exhaust the value of [workers’] activity.”58 Work is in this sense
constitutive of self and person.59 This characterization of work would seem
consistent with the positive concept of objectification that we propose: an
externalization and actualization of oneself in the music, the art, the craft, or
potentially many other forms of work. Yet Radin’s restrictions on the meanings of
objectification and commodification do not permit as positive a subject’s
objectification in his or her work. Work, Radin writes, always contains a
“noncommodified human element.”60 For us, the issue is not commodification or
noncommodification but whether the objectification is positive or not.61 Radin by

CULTURE 8, 8 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter Radin &
Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification].
54

See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 16-29 (developing the
notion of “market-inalienability”).
55

See id. at xii.

56

See id. at 20.

57

See RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 50.

58

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 105.

59

Id.

60

Id. (emphasis added).

61

This approach seems consistent with and supportive of work by the newer generation of
commodification theorists. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, Preface:
Freedom, Equality, and the Many Futures of Commodification, in RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 53, at 1, 4
[hereinafter Ertman & Williams, Preface] (“The new materials in this book, taken as a whole,
argue against the vision of a world bifurcated into separate hostile spheres whose boundary is
policed by commodification anxiety. In fact, intimate relations typically have economic
dimensions, and market relations often do not adhere to the model of self-interest, and selfinterest alone.”); see also Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither Commodification, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 53,
at 402, 412 [hereinafter Rose, Afterword] (arguing that commodification may be “normgenerative” rather than simply “norm-destructive”).
In an introductory essay to this volume, Radin demonstrates that she is receptive to this
new scholarship. She and co-author Madhavi Sunder write that the questions this new
scholarship raises “remind us that the goal is not commodification or noncommodification, per
se, but rather . . . a world in which all individuals and groups have rights to make their cultural
worlds.” Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, supra note 53, at 20.
Our criticism is that Radin does not fully address this theme in her theory of commodification,
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contrast emphasizes the “personal touch in one’s work,”62 the “personal aspect of
work,”63 rather than the personhood achieved in the objectification in the work. At
the same time that “our culture persistently commodifies and objectifies,” Radin
maintains, it also “stubbornly insists on conceiving of the person as moral agent, as
humane subject distinct from the world of objects.”64 Personhood must be protected
from objectification. Objectification is the “failure to respect in theory and to make
space in practice for the human subject.”65 Objectification is the negation of the
human subject.66 Ironically, while Radin criticizes the dualism that splits subject and
object,67 it is a dualism that in this regard she herself maintains.
We contend, then, that Radin does not maintain a distinction between positive
and negative forms of externalization. Rather than concentrate on whether particular
types of commodification are good or bad, a more useful distinction may be whether
externalization is good or bad. If externalization is good and so a positive form of
self-actualization, it should be called objectification. If the externalization is bad in
the sense that the human expression in the thing or object is stripped away, then it
should be called alienation or reification.68 We shall prefer to use the term reification

and we go on to argue that attention to externalization and objectification would help to orient
this reconceptualization.
62

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 105 (emphasis added).

63

Id. at 108 (emphasis added).

64

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 341,
343 (1991) [hereinafter Radin, Objectification] (emphasis added).
65

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 155.

66

Id.

67

To be precise, Radin maintains that her project blurs the distinction both between subject
and object – which “calls to mind the disjunction between persons and things” – and between
the subjective and the objective – which “calls to mind the disjunction between what is
‘inside’ the will of a person . . . and what is ‘outside’ in the world of objects . . . .” RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 28, at 9. As should be apparent, we also attempt to
break down both of these distinctions, and we argue Radin maintains an inappropriate division
between subject and its objectification in the object.
68
See, e.g., Paul Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation dans l’Expérience Historique, 45
ARCHIVIO DI FILOSOFIA 27 (1975) [hereinafter Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation]
(developing the distinction between objectification and alienation). Ricoeur here equates
alienation with reification. See id. at 32. He also appears to derive the concept of
objectification independently from Marx, who is not mentioned in this essay. For further
development of the concept of alienation, see Paul Ricoeur, Aliénation, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
UNIVERSALIS 660 (1968).
We are aware that the term objectification may have a negative connotation in English, as
it does, for instance, in Radin. See, e.g., Radin, Objectification, supra note 64. We retain this
term because it is the customary one used in positive contexts in English, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-49 (on Marx), and in most translations of Ricoeur’s usage of the term.
See infra text accompanying notes 77, 79, 81, 83. But the French term “objectivation,” see
supra, may come closer to disclosing what we are after: a sense of an objectifying process by
human activity rather than just the object produced, the objectification. In at least one of his
articles, Ricoeur’s use of the French term “objectivation” was translated into English by the
identical term. See Paul Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics,
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for the negative form of externalization, because the word’s etymology (from the
Latin res, thing)69 underscores the transformation of something into only a thing. Its
human and relational qualities are gone. To the extent that Radin concludes that
externalization—whether in the form of objectification or its subcategory
commodification—is necessarily negative, she seems to be rejecting the relational
view of fact and value that she otherwise strongly defends.70 Just because something
is an object or thing, that “facticity” does not make it negative. Rather, its facticity is
value-dependent;71 in the present context, the object or thing is negative or positive
depending on whether it is a positive externalization or not. In turn, the
differentiation between positive and negative externalization rests on appreciation
first of the need for and inevitability of externalization of anything internal, and we
turn to draw especially on Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to develop this understanding.
Ricoeur is sympathetic to Radin’s concern for the protection of the inward
qualities of personhood. But he insists that we know of these inward qualities by
their outward externalizations:
In opposition to . . . the claim of the subject to know itself by immediate
and direct intuition, we must say that we understand ourselves via the
detour of the signs of humanity sedimented in the works of culture. The
structure of the work is the tool of this sedimentation and therefore also of
this highly mediated mode of transmission. What would we know of love
and hatred – and, in general of the feelings and the values which support
the Self – if they had not been brought to language and articulated by
works of art and discourse? The texture of the text is the bearer of this
mediation.72
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is predicated upon the claim that we understand the self,
others, actions, or history not by intuition but through the marks or signs they
display.73 These marks or signs are exteriorizations; they are texts and texts that
need to be interpreted. The exteriorization of signs—e,g., gestures, dance, language,

5 STUDIES IN RELIGION SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES 14, 18 (1975-76) (Can.) [hereinafter Ricoeur,
Philosophical Hermeneutics].
69
See WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
1210 (1994).
70

See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.

71

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 89.

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

72
Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 30; see also PAUL RICOEUR, THE
CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS 327 (Don Ihde ed., 1974) (“The first truth—I think, I am—
remains as abstract and empty as it is unassailable. It must be ‘mediated’ by representations,
actions, works, institutions, and monuments which objectify it . . . .”) (second emphasis
added).
73

This emphasis in Ricoeur marks a signal departure of his hermeneutics from that of
Gadamer’s. Gadamer views objectification as necessarily alienating, and he critiques the
method of the human sciences as alienating because objectifying. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR,
The Task of Hermeneutics, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 43, 60 (John B.
Thompson ed. & trans., 1981) (exploring this distinction); Ricoeur, Philosophical
Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 14.
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and so on74—is the first condition for the understanding of another, and these signs
are a text that we must interpret.75 Writing is possible because discourse itself
presents a form of exteriorization that permits its inscription in a material medium.76
Action is textual in its objectification or exteriorization that is similar to the fixation
that occurs in writing.77 Our belonging to traditions must pass through “the
interpretation of the signs, works and texts in which cultural heritages are inscribed
and offer themselves to be deciphered.”78 Communication of these past heritages
therefore occurs under the condition of their objectification.79 Radin argues that “it is
hard to see our work, either physical or intellectual, as belonging intrinsically . . . to
the object realm.”80 By contrast, Ricoeur insists that exteriorization or objectification
is an ineluctable element of human activity;81 it is as primitive and radical—that is, to
the root—as possible.82 The relationship between objectification and interpretation is
not dichotomous but complementary.83 Hermeneutics wants to identify within the
work what the text is trying to say, but “this discourse is given nowhere else than in

74

For an exploration of how these activities may assume forms of legal expression in
various cultures, see Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to Our Senses”: Communication and
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873 (1992).
75

Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation, supra note 68, at 34-35 (citing Dilthey).

76

Id. at 35.

77

PAUL RICOEUR, The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, in
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 73, at 197, 203 (action as
objectification); Paul Ricoeur, Explanation and Understanding, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL
RICOEUR 149, 160 (Charles E. Reagan & David Stewart eds., 1978) (action as exteriorization).
As with discourse, action’s exteriorization permits its subsequent inscription in archives and
documents. Id.
Analogy can be properly drawn here to the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz. See
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). Geertz’s concept of culture is
semiotic. See id. at 5. The “thick description” of cultural meaning that is his aspiration, see,
e.g., id. at 7, he explicitly analogizes to interpreting a literary text. See id. at 448. “[C]ultural
forms can be treated as texts, as imaginative works built out of social materials . . . .” Id. at
449. Geertz makes plain that he borrows the idea of the inscription of action from Ricoeur.
See id. at 19. Radin also cites Geertz but not to similar effect. See, e.g., RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 83; Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of
Commodification, supra note 53, at 26 n.33.
78

RICOEUR, The Task of Hermeneutics, supra note 73, at 62.

79

Paul Ricoeur, Ethics and Culture, in POLITICAL
Stewart & Joseph Bien eds., 1974).

AND

SOCIAL ESSAYS 243, 264 (David

80

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 38.

81

Ricoeur, Objectivation et Aliénation, supra note 68, at 27.

82

Id. at 35.

83

Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 19; Paul Ricoeur, The
Hermeneutical Task of Distanciation, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra
note 73, at 131, 140.
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and by the structure of the work.”84 For our purposes, it is also provocative that
Gadamer calls what the text is trying to say the “thing” of the text.85
A second level of exteriorization takes us beyond the objectification of
personhood in individual outward expressions or actions to the objectification that
may be operable in a larger discourse, theory, story, or doctrine. Consider Radin’s
many writings, for example. They are all exteriorizations and objectifications of
herself and the ideas and arguments she wants to express. Ricoeur comments,
“[D]iscourse displays a quite high level of objectification, similar to that of the
products of work in relation to the process of production. Man objectifies himself
through the works of his discourse, as he does through the products of his
craftsmanship, and his art.”86 Part of our aim here is again to draw attention, now at
the level of discourse, to how exteriorization or objectification can be positive and
worth preserving. We also want to go further, though, to evaluate how Radin’s
method, in its discussion of policy and doctrine, falls along the spectrum between the
poles of metaphoric and speculative or conceptual discourse. We argue that although
Radin demonstrates some sensitivity to and adherence to more conceptual discourse,
she typically aligns with more metaphoric discourse. She only limitedly endorses
conceptual discourse, because it is more objectifying. We will turn in Part III to
contend that in intellectual property law, objectifying discourse can be more positive
and less reifying than Radin allows.
The poles of metaphoric and conceptual discourse can be well represented by
Carol Rose’s distinction in property law between crystalline rules and muddy ones.87
Crystal rules are “hard-edged,” or in our vocabulary reductive and univocal; they are
imposed regardless of context.88 Muddy rules, by contrast, are attentive to context;
they are more relational, more metaphoric. They are more discretionary, equitable
judgments.89 In her review of various property doctrines, Rose finds a cycle that
“alternates between crystals and mud.”90
Radin’s analyses encompass both more metaphoric and more conceptual forms of
discourse. Her theory of personhood, for example, appreciates both the need for
stability and flexibility. “For appropriate self-constitution,” she writes, “both strong
attachment to context and strong possibilities for detachment from context are
needed.”91 Regard for more ideal theories of personhood—of freedom and
identity—is appropriate, yet, she continues: “[A]s a pragmatist, I believe nonideal
theory is also necessary, because our visions about the nature of human beings and of
84

Ricoeur, Philosophical Hermeneutics, supra note 68, at 22.

85

See id. at 30 (describing how Gadamer calls the “what” of the text “die Sache des Texts,
the ‘thing,’ the ‘issue at stake’ in the text, the in re of the text”). No specific reference to
Gadamer is provided.
86

Id. at 21.

87

See CAROL M. ROSE, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION,
supra note 5, at 199.
88

See id. at 199.

89

See id. at 200.

90

Id. at 205.

91

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 61.
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the good life for human beings cannot be too far divorced from the circumstances
that give rise to those visions . . . .”92 The pragmatic element in Radin’s analyses is
the strongest, and her very attentiveness to context and circumstance places her more
toward the relational, metaphoric end of discourse. This relational emphasis
pervades her work. She writes of her pragmatism: “A serious pluralism . . . makes
possible a commitment to dialogue among alternative conceptions.”93 Truth, she
writes elsewhere, “may not be some absolute value apart from the debate; but truth
may still be conceived to be the end result of unconstrained conversation.”94 As we
have previously discussed,95 Radin’s contribution in the present Symposium is full of
relational language. “[W]hat counts as property is malleable.”96 Various aspects of
property are contested.97 Property interests must be balanced.98 Property doctrine—
the “propertization neighborhood”—must itself be interrelated to other doctrinal
neighborhoods so that is “aware of its function within the city as a whole.”99
Yet within this generally relational approach of Radin’s, we want to return to the
possibilities she permits of doctrinal and theoretical objectification. She and Frank
Michelman write that at the same time that they reject the formalist conception of
rules, their pragmatism also leads them to reject claims that “all notions of ruleness
are misleading, all pretenses of ruleness misdirected.”100 It is inappropriate simply to
decide on the basis of “case-by-case judgment, situated decisionmaking moment by
moment.”101 This kind of “[r]adical particularism is incomplete pragmatism because
it shirks the hard pragmatic work of calibrating ruleness to context.”102 While it may
be true that “each and every normative project is liable to deconstruction,” it is also
the case that “the reconstructive moment seems ineradicable.”103 Writing in this
Symposium, Radin endorses the need for “coherence across doctrinal, policy, and
practical boundaries.”104 She wants to achieve a “satisfactory kind of analysis.”105

92

Id. at 63.

93

Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 172526 (1990).
94

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 166.

95

See supra text accompanying notes 4-11.

96

Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 23.

97

Id. at 24.

98

Id. at 25-27.

99

Id. at 23.

100

Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Commentary, Pragmatist
Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1046 (1991).
101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 1057-58.

104

Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 27.

105

Id. at 38.

and

2006]

METAPHOR, OBJECTS, AND COMMODITIES

155

Elsewhere Radin supports the role that “conceptual transformations” can play.106
She appreciates that regulation discouraging commodification would underwrite “a
conceptual structure.”107 She approves making “policy decisions that take into
account our vision of the whole, however extraordinarily difficult that may be.”108
Reconstruction, coherence, analysis, conceptual transformation, conceptual
structure, and visions of the whole are all analytic and conceptual moves that
objectify; they direct and constrain; they do not let metaphor run free.109 In the midst
of her relational approach, Radin allows that this approach also needs analytic rigor
and precision; judgment is not simply situational, simply protean.110 This
interrelation of the metaphoric or relational and the conceptual or analytic is similar
to what we endorsed in the earlier pages on externalization. Conceptual
objectification is not a negative. It may also be ineluctable. Across the spectrum
from metaphoric to speculative discourse, the reach of the conceptual or analytic is
far. Ricoeur writes, for example: “[T]o narrate is already to explain.”111 A narrative
is a construct; the “facts” do not present their own story. Even stable metaphors
constrain and orient us in certain ways.112
If conceptual or doctrinal objectification is not the enemy, then part of the task is
to ascertain in differing contexts how various sorts of objectification – from narrative
to rule – can serve various conceptual, policy, and legal goals.113 Part of the task also

106

Radin, Objectification, supra note 64, at 341.

107

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 7, at 176; see also id. at 173 (noting how
“it seems that the state is always involved in preferring one discourse to another”).
108

Radin, Objectification, supra note 64, at 344. Likewise, she maintains that a vision of
the whole will change as particular policy decisions are made. See id. This interplay of whole
and part is analogous to the hermeneutic interrelation of meaning and application, discussed
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
109
Cf. RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 16, at 261 (“Philosophical discourse
sets itself up as the vigilant watchman overseeing the ordered extensions of meaning; against
this background, the unfettered extensions of meaning in poetic discourse spring free.”).
110

Think analogously of how Ertman & Williams situate their edited collection of new
scholarship on commodification: “In the belief that the right tool is half the job, we hope that
this book will help crystallize a new approach to commodification.” Ertman & Williams,
Preface, supra note 61, at 5. A tool is analytic. Note also the reference to crystallization,
which likely unintentionally recalls Rose’s use of the term. See supra text accompanying note
88.
111

1 PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 178 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer
trans., 1984).
112
Recent work in cognitive theory argues that the structured conceptual systems in the
mind such as metaphor not only “make it possible for us to experience things the way we do,”
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 509, but their commonality and stability help account
for how stable knowledge is possible. Id. at 96. For elaboration of the differences between
the theories of metaphor of Ricoeur and of Lakoff and Johnson, see George H. Taylor,
Cognitive Theory, Conscience, and Law, 6 GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 2006).
113
The work of Carol Rose, for example, analyzes why property discussions resort to
narrative rather than exclusively more scientific analytic approaches. See ROSE, supra note 5,
at 27.
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is to differentiate conceptual and doctrinal objectification from conceptual and
doctrinal reification. In Part III, we turn to examples from intellectual property to
discuss and elaborate more concretely this distinction, but let us close this Part and
introduce the next by way of an example of Radin’s that illustrates the issue. In a
recent article on Information Tangibility,114 Radin expresses concern that
“[a]ssimilation of information to the category of tangibility is fostering
commodification; that is, a great increase in the scope of intellectual property and
allied regimes of privatized information control.”115 According to Radin, the
traditional understanding of intellectual property is that it is composed of something
internal to a person that becomes propertizable when embodied in an external,
tangible object.116 Commodification was “linked to embodiment in a physical
object.”117 Whatever our cautions about Radin’s portrayal of this understanding,118
which she relates back to Kant and Hegel,119 we attend here Radin’s claim that this
traditional understanding no longer operates in the digital world. There has been a
movement to delete recognition of digital information as a product of personhood
and to “redescribe the information itself as a physical object from the outset.”120
Many courts and commentators have accepted that a computer memory’s
arrangement of electrons is not intangible information but a tangible physical object,
and this has led to many online activities being copyrighted that were not similarly
protected offline.121 For Radin, as we have come to expect, her larger objection is
that the more information can be assimilated to objects, the more it is susceptible to
commodification.122 We again wonder, though, whether objectification is the
primary issue or whether instead reification is. Digital information has lost its
relation to its origin as human expression, human externalization. Although her
resulting analysis differs from ours, she captures the problem neatly: “The metaphor
of physicality, of object-ness, has become ever more rhetorically literal.”123 The
reduction of the phenomenon to the literal reifies the phenomenon, cuts it off from its
roots. More generally, the issue should not be that something is propertizable
because of its objectification as a thing or object but is propertized because of
normative judgments about how to conceptualize the thing or object.124 There may
be rhetorical power in assimilating something to the physical, but the rhetorical

114

See Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11.

115

Id. at 397. This concern is also apparent in her article in the present volume. See
Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2.
116

Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 398.

117

Id. at 406.

118

See supra text accompanying notes 34-41.

119

See Radin, Information Tangibility, supra note 11, at 397-98.

120

Id. at 417.

121

Id. at 406.

122

Id. at 417.

123

Id. at 402.

124

See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing the interrelation of fact and value).
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nature of the claim should be the point of examination.125 As we now turn to pursue
through examples drawn from intellectual property law, the issue is not whether
something is externalized and objectified but whether that objectification turns into
reification.126
III. TOWARD AN ACCOUNT OF OBJECTIFICATION AND BOUNDARIES
In this Part, we want to relate this understanding of Radin’s work on
commodification, enhanced via application of Ricoeur’s perspective, briefly to more
recent work on commodification and to Radin’s recent work on property theory and
technology. More generally, we note that the problem that commodification theory
describes, the problem of things, and signs, and interpretation, describes a problem
of salience and permeability. What we describe is, as it is for Radin, essentially a
problem of boundaries, that is, the problem of distinguishing between those “things”
that we value and want to promote, and those “things” that we abhor.
Within commodification theory itself, scholars have come to recognize the
virtues of things. Carol Rose, in her afterword to the recent volume Rethinking
Commodification: Cases And Readings In Law And Culture,127 writes:
Things are both commodities and not commodities. Markets seem
inappropriate for some things, but then again, maybe markets are pretty
useful for exactly the same things. It is interesting that several of the
essays in this volume return to some of Appadurai’s ideas about
“commoditization” (awkward language and all), and particularly to the
idea that over time, things slip in and out of the status of commodity. But
when? And when not? This is the set of questions that the new
commodification theory seems to be addressing.128

125

See ROSE, supra note 5, at 297:
With property, the nature of “things” imposes their own quite fascinating constraints.
Yet even with those, what you see in property is what you and others have talked
yourselves into about those “things”; and given some imagination, you may always
talk yourselves into seeing something else – with all the effects on understanding and
action that a new “envisioning” may bring.

126
For brief consideration of the further fruitfulness of an analysis of the interrelations
between metaphor, objectification, and reification, consider its implications for an analysis of
the sociology of organizations. It is a considerable question, for instance, how institutions can
maintain their originative ethos or vision over time rather than become focused simply on selfperpetuation. David Kennedy has recently examined this problem in the context of
international human rights organizations. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE
(2004). The classical treatment of this issue can be found in Max Weber’s discussion of the
bureaucratic routinization of charisma. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1121-23
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). In our vocabulary, the question here can be
expressed as how the institution’s originative metaphoric impulse can be objectified rather
than reified. Arthur Mitzman types Weber’s work precisely a “sociology of reification.”
ARTHUR MITZMAN, THE IRON CAGE: AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF MAX WEBER 176
(1969).
127

Rose, Afterword, supra note 53.

128

Id. at 404.
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Radin’s co-authored contribution to that book likewise acknowledges the complexity
of modern problems of commodification and the virtues of markets,129 recognizing
the semiotic significance of things, and how that significance not only charges
markets with the conditions of victimhood, but may offer tools for escape. In that
piece Radin is skeptical of the normativity of things, even while commodification
may be strategically useful. But her paper for this symposium seems to be more
sympathetic to the normative argument. The question is in part, as she argues, who
controls the meaning of the thing. When Radin recognizes that the problem of
property does not have a single valence that might be described as “commodification
[and markets] bad” and calls for situating propertization problems in a community of
zones that includes competition and free speech “neighborhoods,” the point is not
merely descriptive.
We propose, however, a broader form of the question, and a form that is, perhaps,
less susceptible of response along a single dimension. The question is not only who
controls the meaning of the thing, but how that meaning is created. The
“neighborhood” metaphor evokes a broader discussion about the character of
neighborhoods, both real and metaphorical. How do we identify a “neighborhood,”
and how do we ordinarily understand its various relationships—with other
neighborhoods, with its inhabitants, with the city or broader community of which it
is a part? Our inner “urban planner” has much to say on all of these questions, but
we want to preface this by grounding the discussion in terms of a distinction drawn
by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin described two fundamentally different roles, or identities,
though which individuals understand the world. On the one hand, there are the
systematizers, for whom knowledge proceeds from what might be called
“universalizing rationalism,” grand, orderly systems that organize human endeavor
based on rules and their application.130 On the other hand, there are the humanists,
for whom knowledge proceeds not from rigorous application of method, but from
understanding. The stuff of our lived experience—empathy, rhetoric, and practice—
is also the stuff of knowledge. Working out the relationship between the relational
and objectification, and describing and applying an appropriate set of tools for doing
so, requires some careful accommodation of both perspectives. It isn’t the case that
there is a single, overarching, and preferred method for balancing the two arguments
for property that Radin describes in her contribution to this symposium, the Demand
Side/Column A and the Supply Side/Column B.131 Nor is it the case that any
question of balancing involves an unbounded inquiry into public policies, where the
parties fight over the “right” set of policies to consider and the “right” level of
abstraction to use in the debate. Rather, we describe a series of interconnected
themes that we draw from the stuff of law itself, themes that law and policy can use
129

Radin & Sunder, The Subject and Object of Commodification, supra note 53.

130

See ISAIAH BERLIN, The Divorce Between the Sciences and the Humanities, in AGAINST
CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 80 (1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, Vico’s Concept of
Knowledge, in AGAINST THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 111 (1979); ISAIAH
BERLIN, Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment, in AGAINST THE CURRENT: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 120 (1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, The Concept of Scientific History, in CONCEPTS
AND CATEGORIES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 103 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979); ISAIAH BERLIN, VICO
AND HERDER: TWO STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1976).
THE
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Radin, Information Propertization, supra note 2, at 25-27.
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and has used in a number of contexts to process problems of objectification and
interpretation, that is, control of meaning and the boundary problem at the core of
commodification theory.
In brief, those themes are: (i) metaphor, language and symbol, rooted in the
related disciplines of cognitive psychology, on the one hand, and the hermeneutic
principles of interpretation described in the last Part, on the other; (ii) narrative and
storytelling, which also embraces some aspects of ritual and community, i.e.,
propertization’s social milieu, in addition to its legal and economic milieu; (iii) the
domain of objects, that is, the thingness of things constructed by and for the law;
(iv) space and place, which we understand as including both the metaphorically and
literally physical or spatial character of social and legal relations; and (v) discipline
and social practice, or, in other words, forms of collective understanding and
behavior. None of these is truly independent of the others. All of them are rooted, at
one level or another, in concerns of metaphor and concept as well as in experience
and pragmatics. They are each systematic in a sense, yet simultaneously based in
and constructed from the everyday. At the same time, none of them, or even all of
them taken together, is a complete answer to the problem posed by the distinction
between commodification and objectification. We offer them tentatively, as
possibilities for further exploration and research.
A. On Metaphor and Language132
The first and perhaps most important source of differentiation is language itself.
“Commodification” and “commoditization,” “thing-ness” and “thingy-ness” and
“thingification” are difficult terms, but they capture something imperative about our
experience of the world.133 We argue that language is essentially metaphorical,134
and that metaphors are not merely literary, but cognitive.135 Language maps deep
cognitive structures and thus mirrors cultural patterns and social structures.136 We
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talk as we do because of how we think and act, rather than the reverse.137
Linguistically, our categories are built largely on our experiences.
George Lakoff proposes that metaphoric meanings are mapped to experience on a
one-to-one target (metaphor) to source (experience) basis. Gilles Fauconnier and
Mark Turner elaborate this thesis, arguing that we experience overlapping
metaphorical frameworks.138 Each of these frameworks comprises a "mental space"
constructed by a listener or reader and consisting of elements, roles, strategies, and
relationships, all of which the listener uses in reasoning and creating meaning.
Overlapping "mental spaces" are linked via the process of "cognitive blending,"
which accommodates dynamism in the process of understanding.139 Querying the
extent and stability of a linguistic practice is a way of decoding the extent and
stability of the corresponding behavior and social practice. Moreover, that
investigation inevitably has both descriptive and normative dimensions.140 Our use
of metaphor carries with it an evaluative dimension that is always at least implicit.
In large part, to bring metaphor and language into the foreground of the boundary
distinguishing commodity from object is to make that evaluation explicit.
Armed with this perspective, we can see the work of language and metaphor in
legal analysis all around us. Radin’s contribution frames her discussion in terms of
neighborhoods and cities, a metaphorical mapping of legal doctrine onto physical
territory. The neighborhood metaphor is not the only one at hand, however, even if
physical metaphors are deeply embedded in our thinking about property. Managers
in businesses deal with disciplinary single-mindedness, but they often refer to the
problem as one of “silos” rather than as one of “neighborhoods.” Edward Rubin has
explored the role of metaphor in law in a number of different contexts. In corporate
law, he observes that our metaphoric “image” of the corporation affects our
presumptions about the character of corporate regulation.141 In administrative law,
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Rubin argues the traditional hierarchical metaphor of governance should be replaced
by the more descriptively accurate “network” model.142
The metaphoric approach is equally significant when we move from broad
regulatory metaphors to more precise applications of metaphor to legal doctrine.
Radin repeats the common criticism of the use of physicalist metaphors in legislation
and judicial decisions applying intellectual property rules to the internet, in the
context of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for example, and the curious
contemporary application of the doctrine of trespass to chattels.143 It is important to
recognize, however, that the metaphor does not necessarily stand in the way here.
Because of its centrality to our ordinary experience, metaphor can be an important
tool for progressive analysis. In intellectual property law, James Boyle has
championed a call for “cultural environmentalism” on the Internet,144 a theme that
manifests itself in concrete proposals to preserve (and conserve) a “commons,”
which is metaphorically related to but distinct from the public domain. Boyle’s
“environmentalism” is in the first place a product, not a driver, of a shared sense that
intellectual property issues pose problems of inter-generational resource allocation
and stewardship, for example. To speak of an object as a thing or as a commodity, is
not necessarily to construct a category for political and legal rhetoric. It may be to
introduce our actual experience into the policy debate.
The problem of the “commons” in intellectual property law is precisely the sort
of problem that discerning the boundary between “good” and “bad” objectification is
designed to investigate. The most recent example of the metaphoric approach to this
relationship, in the context of the commons, is the inquiry by the United States
Copyright Office into the problem of what are now universally referred to as
“orphan” works.145 “Orphan” works are copyrighted works whose owners can no
longer be found. The familial metaphor is not original to this inquiry; there is a long
custom in intellectual property law and among authors themselves of both believing
that books and other expressive works are the “children” of their creators and
referring to those works accordingly.146 Creators, like parents, have the presumptive
right to control the experience of their “children” in the world and to shield them
from exploitation and abuse, and advocates for strong authorial rights implicitly and
sometimes explicitly invoke that emotional bond to justify a legislative or judicial
result.147 On the other hand, the metaphor is regarded as offering a poor fit for
American copyright law, since it is often invoked in support of forms of “moral
142
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rights” – rights of attribution of the work, and of integrity of the work – that are only
weakly represented in American law.
The recent Copyright Office report, however, uses that metaphor in a more
progressive sense. Having recognized the metaphor, the office explicitly adopts its
normative implications: If copyrighted works implicitly have “parents,” rather than
authors and publishers, the “orphan” label is consistent with viewing the orphan
works problem much as child welfare advocates view the problem of abandoned and
abused children. The policy problem here is that new users of those works may
propose valuable uses but be discouraged from pursuing them, out of fear that
publicity accompanying the use will lead the disappeared owners to emerge and
demand supra-market compensation, and even injunctive relief. The Office
produced a report that explicitly recognized the problem in “orphan” terms and that
proposed a concrete remedy: a legislative fix that would limit remedies available to
newly-appearing owners of truly “orphan” works. The proposal may or may not suit
all claims equally, but it is clear that the metaphor offers a useful frame for analyzing
the issue.
B. On Stories148
It is important to begin with language and metaphor, but not to end with it.
Experience may produce language, but our use of metaphor is interpretive and
iterative, even if individual words and phrases evoke meaning that expresses our
experience in a direct way. Equally important, describing the problem of boundaries
as a problem of language obscures not only the identity of the persons or groups
whose experiences matter, but also the mechanism by which those experiences get
inscribed linguistically. Supplementing the linguistic perspective with others
becomes critical.
Most of us create meanings for our lives by blending experience and metaphor
into stories. Narrative, then, supplies a second tool for approaching the distinction
between commodity and object. We focus on narrative in two distinct, but related,
senses. First, there is the modern academic sense of "narrative" as a social construct
that integrates diverse phenomena into some meaningful, if necessarily incomplete,
whole.149 This is partly Robert Cover's nomos,150 and it is also importantly what
Martha Nussbaum commended as an act of "literary imagination."151 In law,
148
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narrative permits us to both see the world as it is, by structuring apparently disparate
phenomena, and perhaps to understand or imagine, as a writer might do, the world as
it might be.152
There is also, of course, the related and powerful sense of "narrative" as story, as
a tale that has power and relevance because it has a beginning, a middle and an end.
In this context, metaphor is this Aristotelian narrative,153 rather than Platonic essence.
We ask, for example, what is the story of the copyrighted work whose author cannot
be located, rather than “is this an orphan work”? Theoretical constructs, metaphors
and technologies, that is, commodities and objects, become characters, settings,
themes and plots.154
Where do we find these narratives, or how do we construct them? Narrative
requires the same tools that metaphor supplies: our lived experience, with character,
and movement, and boundaries. Even the online world, with its apparent boundlessness,155 supplies these things in a growing variety of ways, linear and traditional as
well as non-linear and unconventional. Cyberspace is determined and bounded by
the processes by which it is created and experienced. The boundaries of cyberspace
are recursive, generated dynamically both via human engagement and via
technological processes, and constantly re-determined. Boundaries do exist, if in a
non-traditional sense, at the levels of software and communications protocols that
enable digital communication and at the level of computer software that we engage
as users.156 We can, as a result, tell both traditional and non-traditional stories about
law.157 Stories are determined recursively by the processes of their telling and retelling. The reader is merely establishing one pattern from among a large number of
patterns whose potential is embedded in the technology. Traditional text-based
narratives are historically contingent instantiations of a cognitive framework for the
recognition of meaning in context. The narrative construct does not depend on a
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particular technology.158 There are many beginnings and many ends, rather than one
of each. The reader or user chooses and, in doing so, selects the boundaries of his or
her own experience.
What this describes from a socio-technical perspective obviously stands in
metaphorically for what happens in law.159 We can differentiate commodities from
objects, bad things from good things, in part by explicitly explaining, exploring, and
contrasting the narratives that can be constructed out of them. We cannot do this
comprehensively before the fact, that is, as a way of categorizing something ex ante
as one form or another. Instead, we rely on narrative after the fact to validate the
synthesis that we think is both pragmatically and morally correct.
Carol Rose shows that narrative methodology can be applied in property law
contexts at almost any level of abstraction, and that it can be used predictively and
instrumentally as well as symbolically.160 In intellectual property law, a particularly
clear example comes from the recent debate over the lawfulness of “file sharing” or
“peer-to-peer” (P2P) technologies for distributing computer files on the internet.
Today, that debate is framed by a case decided more than 20 years ago, involving the
lawfulness of the videocassette recorder. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios161 the Supreme Court upheld distribution of the VCR over the challenge that
the machine enabled widespread copyright infringement by home users making
unauthorized recordings of broadcast television programs. Those home users, a
majority of the Court concluded, were engaged in lawful “time-shifting” of
television shows by recording them for later viewing. As subsequent commentators
have often pointed out, however, not only was the evidence of “time-shifting” by
VCR users far more equivocal than the Court acknowledged, but Sony, the
manufacturer and defendant in the case, had marketed the machines for use in taping
and archiving favorite television programs. One might conclude, with only a bit of
rhetorical excess, that the story of the case proved to be more persuasive than the
facts.
Today, the Sony precedent is the starting point for evaluation of P2P file sharing
networks, such as Napster, Aimster, and Grokster. Defenders of those networks
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have suffered in copyright litigation at least in large part because they have yet to
develop a narrative as persuasive as the story that “time-shifting” told.162 Timeshifting for television programming has been neologized to “space-shifting” of other
entertainment media, the idea being that a consumer who pays once for a permanent
copy of a song or a motion picture should be entitled to listen to or watch that
content on any available, compatible device. The “shifting” here is obviously
metaphorical. So far, the courts (with one small exception) have not recognized the
legitimacy of the attempted narratival transfer.163 Right now, the story of free P2P
networks can be reduced to a single, alternative story: theft.
The important lesson to be reaffirmed here is that metaphor and narrative do not
simply happen. They are parts and products of our own lives. Advocates rely on
narratives to help their clients; policymakers rely on narratives to advance agendas.
The variety of our experience and the flexibility of technology suggest that we can
design our own narratives.164 Articulation and distinction, and boundaries and
permeability, in Radin’s sense of neighborhood, often lie within our own control.165
C. On Objects166
The insidiousness of accepting objects uncritically lies in accepting how things
mask legal and power relations within groups, between groups and individuals, and
between individuals. This is the evil of reification, and in the world of digital
networks and biotechnology, there is a considerable risk that conceptual reification
of the legal thing (or what Margaret Radin referred to as “conceptual severance”167)
162
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will be replicated in physical and digital objects themselves. A DVD that can be
played only on a DVD player encoded with complementary technology obtained
from an “authorized” source exercises a form of governance over human behavior
that we might historically have presumed could arise only via human agency.
Yet precisely because things exercise authority, objects—especially configurable
and re-configurable objects of the sort that digital and biotechnology advances now
enable—can be tremendously inexpensive and effective way of communicating in
those same contexts.168 Objects have semiotic or symbolic as well as instrumental
virtues. Social groups, for example, both create and depend on objects. As Wendy
Gordon has noted, “Shareable goods are a traditional source of binding groups
together: not only standard ‘public goods’ such as highways and defense, but also
folk tales, art, songs, and symphonies.”169 Objects need not be tangible; they can be
virtual. Beth Noveck observes that in social contexts on the Internet, online groups
depend on stable digital representations of group members and group-related
objects.170 Thomas Schelling described the concept of “focal points,” now
sometimes referred to as “Schelling Points,” to describe objects or sites around
which individuals coordinate their activities.171 Science, Technology, and Society
(STS) scholars refer to “affordances” of objects in the physical world to denote the
role that objects play in shaping how individuals behave and how group dynamics
evolve.172 Customs, traditions, patterns, and practices of reproduction, modification,
and use develop and intersect via connections to things.173 Communications
channels develop to discuss, respond to, and simply to use things. Things embody
information that communities and groups develop, deposit, and extract.174
Things occupy these social and authoritative roles via their presence and relative
permanence, but things are not simply given. They are created, and they evolve. We
tend to understand intuitively that the world around us has a constructed character,
and we can use ordinary tools of regulation, much of the time, to affect its shape.
For safety reasons, the federal government requires that the automobile include seat
belts and air bags, for example, and a third brake light (the “Liddy light”). Digital
168
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technology now shows us the limits of this approach. As Radin has argued, what we
ordinarily think of as legal questions can get submerged in the design of digital
objects and computer programs, which deprives legal institutions of their usual
regulatory levers and leaves us seemingly at a loss for what to do.175
Yet law is not really so helpless. It has quite an elaborate set of mechanisms that
it uses to create and manage “thing-ness,” that is, both to regulate the extent to which
“legal” and “technical” issues merge, and more broadly to police boundaries between
commodities and objects, that is, to recognize the good in things. Much as we
suggested in the last Section that narratives of objects be made more explicit, we
argue that an equivalent concern for salience can be brought to bear on things
themselves. Sometimes the law reinforces thing-ness, for example, by increasing the
hard edges of copyrights and patents, or software licenses, such as the open source
“General Public License” that coordinates group activity. Sometimes the law
disables or moderates thing-ness, by loosening those edges with exceptions and
limitations. The STS tradition, which is especially attentive to changes in things
over time, commends situating thing-ness by referring to practices. A thing might be
defined by how it is used, an approach that we see in commercial law, for example.
The law also manages thing-ness by referring to economics (“the welfare effects of
things”), to bargains and contracting (via clickwrap agreements, the parties agree on
what a “thing” “is,” and courts get to choose whether or not to validate that
agreement), to design (“it’s just the way things are,” or more precisely, the way the
designer chooses to make the thing), and/or to the essential properties of the object
(“the natural or essential character of things”). Each of these approaches has
strengths and weaknesses, and no single approach is right for all occasions. But the
law generally has a robust set of tools to manage this question.
As but one example, consider books. Copyright commentators have noted that
the Internet lacks the material characteristics that defined traditional copyright law.
In particular, the lack of "book-ish"-ness of information created, stored and
distributed on electronic networks has been a cause for concern on the ground that it
appears to signify the passing of an effective doctrine of first sale,176 among other
things. Publishers “license” the distribution of digital books. Since consumers do
not acquire ownership of their “copies,” courts may decide that the doctrine of first
sale does not apply; in other words, while the purchaser of a traditional book may
resell that copy, the “purchaser,” or rather, “licensee,” of an electronic book may not
do so. Part of the problem is that the question "What is a book?" has to be re-asked
when text is presented in electronic form. Should it matter how books are produced?
Should it matter how books are consumed? So far, it appears, what matters most is
an “objective” definition of the book, and an electronic book is not "a book,"177
though the question is hardly free from doubt.
175
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Similar questions have arisen even more recently in the context of Google’s
ambitious proposal to create a searchable digital archive that contains the entirety of
the collections of some this country’s largest academic libraries. This is Google
Book Search. To the extent that publishers of copyrighted works in these collections
object to the digitization without their authorization, the project faces some
important challenges under copyright law. Google appears to be making millions of
unauthorized “copies” of copyrighted works without the permission of the copyright
owners. Or, perhaps Google is engaged in the application of the fair use doctrine at a
scale never before imagined in human history. Google is, in a sense, a 21st century
digital extension of the university and of the library, making knowledge accessible
and interpretable on a scale never before attempted, but uniquely suited to the new
networked international cultural community.
Which is it? Here, even more starkly than with “new use” and “new technology”
problems posed by electronic books, we benefit not only from thinking about what
kind of narrative helps put the various pieces and places into some kind of coherent
scheme, but also from thinking about what it means for a library to house “a book”—
as opposed to (or in addition to) a warehouse of the information that those books
contain. Importantly, and to connect this theme to the first two, “books” are both
objects, and metaphors.
D. On Place and Space178
A different, or perhaps supplemental, way to look at the Google Book Search
example is to recover the physicalist metaphor that Radin, among others, largely
rejects. To its defenders, Google Book Search appeals partly to our collective sense
that libraries exist to organize and distribute information for public benefit, so that
Google—which might be characterized as organizing and distributing that
information on a massive scale—is simply stepping into the librarians’ shoes. Yet
libraries are places and spaces as much as they are domains of intellectual activity.
Sociologists and geographers are acutely aware of the role of place and its cousin,
space, in ordering human behavior.179 Individuals want and need to know where they
are, and where others are, in order to manage various communicative practices.180
This relationship flows in the opposite direction as well. Critical geographers point
out that places derive their character from the social practices situated there.181 Place
and space structure social relationships, and are structured by them.
178
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In the physical world, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford, and others pointed out long
ago the extent to which we take space and place for granted, and the extent to
which—resisting that sense—we can manage our environment to produce and
support different kinds of social interaction.182 Architects and planners can do this
through design. Law, too, can do it by rewarding features of the physical
environment that signal the presence of bounded places.183 The urban planner Kevin
Lynch demonstrated this in The Image of the City,184 concluding that inhabitants of a
city relied on mental “readings” of their cities, focusing on landmarks and
boundaries: “[I]f the environment is visibly organized and sharply identified, then
the citizen can inform it with his own meanings and connections. Then it will
become a true place, remarkable and unmistakable.”185 Lynch used his subjects’
reactions to the delineation of their environments as measures of “imageability,”
defined as “that quality in a physical object which gives it a high probability of
evoking a strong image in any given observer. It is that shape, color, or arrangement
which facilitates the making of vividly identified, powerfully structured, highly
useful mental images of the environment.”186 An “imageable” city conveys a
coherent mental map to its inhabitants.187 Place is not simply a matter of where you
are. Place and space are cognitive constructs.
When the question is how to develop a sense of what Radin might call a
metaphorical legal neighborhood, or what we might call legal urbanity, the same
lessons apply. The environmental heterogeneity and salience that Jacobs and
Mumford praised, and the “imageability” that Lynch described, can be developed in
legal contexts. How do we trade commodity against object, or recognize free speech
or unfair competition law as domains that are adjacent to property law? Radin, like
other scholars, is skeptical of the use of place and space metaphors in legal analysis.
But we argue that those resources can be turned to our advantage. The apparent
“physical” features of an online setting may be sufficiently stable to signify “place”
to the individuals who “go” and “stay” there. With objects, the law might affirm the
salience of the “good” objects and lessen the salience (and heighten the relational
character) of the bad.
Law has the tools for this exercise, which we can use to reward “imageability.”
Online, for example, boundaries, borders, and connections in computer networks
may be omnipresent as a technical matter but hidden, for all intents and purposes,
Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
791 (1995).
182
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from the perspective of those who use those networks. Law and policy may
intervene to promote (or lessen) the salience of those boundaries and borders in a
variety of doctrinal settings. Purported acceptances of offers of clickwrap
agreements and “terms of use” may be deemed ineffective if offers are not
sufficiently visible.188 “Technological protection measures” that trigger application
of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may
be deemed “ineffective” if the user is not sufficiently warned of their existence.189 In
property law, it might be argued that the doctrine of “trespass to chattels” may not be
invoked by the owner of an online data resource unless the boundary that the
defendant has crossed is marked in some clear, human-readable way.190
E. On Convention, Pattern, and Practice191
Among the socially-constructed recourses at our metaphorical disposal here are
social phenomena themselves. We experience the world not only in terms of the
language that we use, the stories that we tell, the objects that we make and find, and
the places that we inhabit, but in terms of the social organization that we build. A
fifth tool that we might explore in elaborating and supplementing Radin’s relational
analysis is the study of groups, and more precisely, the study of social practices and
disciplines.
This is a difficult concept to capture briefly, since so much has been written by so
many and from a broad variety of perspectives. In a recent article on fair use in
copyright law, one of us analyzed economic, sociological, cultural and
anthropological literature and concluded that the law can effectively query patterns
of social behavior oriented around particular disciplines or practices, such as
journalism, or scholarship. In turn, those patterns may serve as stable referents for
applying the notoriously elusive “fair use” concept. But while we are guided by the
belief that that each of these bodies of literature is ultimately talking about the same
subject, that sense is more tentative than firm.
Disciplines, for example, come with sets of rules. Those are soft rules, to be
sure, but typically rules that are recognized both inside and outside the discipline and
that police the borders of the discipline and activity by its members. Professional
disciplines are not the only sources of rules. Rules can be borrowed from outside
contexts, or they can emerge from sustained interaction among individuals. They
may be formal; they may consist of social norms; and/or they may consist of
conventions or regularities in social behavior. Among other things, this echoes the
notion of "fields" of practice proposed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu,
who offered the idea of the habitus to define the formal and informal processes—the
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knowledge base, the internalized codes of thought and action, and manners of
thought, or in sum, the feel for how things are done, or the activities and concepts
that both unify and produce practices and representations—that constrain action
within a given domain.192
Equally helpful analytic resources here include the broad concepts of the
institution, which encompasses individuals, groups, relationships, and cognitive
schemes and frames for constructing them;193 the community of practice, groups of
individuals united informally by shared normative expectations, habits, customs, and
group identity;194 and "practice" itself, defined as a shared but informal set of
practical understandings, with a normative component, embedded in social
structures.195 The underlying point is that the existence and content of a given
pattern cannot be determined entirely or even primarily within the analytic
framework supplied by legal doctrine itself. The tool here is part of a broader
theoretical approach that situates the foundations of stable law largely in social
conventions rather than solely in legal institutions.196
The common issue is the extent of limitations on discretionary behavior within a
specified social or cultural network, limitations that might be internalized via
socialization or professional training, or that might be imposed externally via
192
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participation in the pattern, or both. Social "norms" as guides to individual behavior
are relevant, but they are neither the necessary beginning nor the end of the question.
A social or cultural pattern may be defined by informal expectations, customs, and
habits, by norms, by more formal organizations, institutions, or hierarchies, by
communications and coordination networks, or by a combination of these.197
Relevant evidence may consist of individual practices and behaviors themselves,
structures of formal and informal groups, and descriptions of cognitive structures,
such as schemata and scripts.198 Evidence may be purely contemporary, or it may
incorporate history and tradition.
We should make explicit that a “disciplinary” tool accepts at least the possibility
of group agency alongside traditional accounts of individual agency. At the very
least, the two perspectives need to be accounted for. Anthony Giddens does so with
his "structuration" thesis, positing that individuals (particular actions) and groups
(rules) are functionally inseparable because they are in the ongoing process of
simultaneously constructing each other.199 Intentionality is contextual, making social
groups and structures an inherent part of social analysis. Mark Johnson explains this
point in terms that crystallizes the social practices perspective and connects it to the
frameworks above that are based more explicitly on metaphor and cognition:
[A]ny statements we make, any directives we give, any rules we lay down
are applicable, not because the concepts specify their own determinate
conditions of satisfaction, but rather because we understand these
concepts and rules relative to shared idealized cognitive models, scripts,
and narratives that are tied to embodied experiences, communal histories,
practices, and values. The rules can work, when they work, precisely
because of these framing cognitive models and practices. They are not . . .
merely non-propositional, non-semantic background assumptions. Rather,
they are part of our conceptual apparatus by which we make sense of and
act purposively within concrete situations.200
How might we make use of this method in approaching the underlying question
of commodities and objects? How do social practices illuminate the relational
character of that question? One example is patent law. Scholars looking at the
sociology of science have recognized that the optimal organization of scientific
research consists of independent communities of researchers working with
knowledge of one another’s activities.201 Welfare costs from duplicative research are
197
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more than offset by correction of mistakes, confirmation of research results, and
differential analyses of common data, leading to better syntheses.202 Pure “science,”
in turn, receives special dispensations in intellectual property law. “Laws of nature”
(the objects of basic scientific research) are unpatentable. Until recently, academic
practitioners of patented technology could look to an “experimental use” exemption
from liability for patent infringement. Measuring what is “basic” and therefore
unpatentable is a disciplinary problem; like most patent law metrics, the issue is
framed in terms of the understanding of a hypothetical “Person Having Ordinary
Skill in the Art.” What is in and what is out, in other words, is explicitly a question
of disciplinary understanding.
The experimental use doctrine shows how
disciplinary bulwarks that historically have protected the public domain from
propertization may evolve as the discipline itself evolves. The Federal Circuit
appears to have cut back the experimental use exception dramatically, on the
rationale that university-based research are no longer presumptively entitled to rely
on characterization by reference to a disciplinary understanding of “basic science,”203
and therefore should not presume that university-based research is not subject to
ordinary rules of patent infringement.
Disciplinary practices and normative communities are, in part, sorts of narratives,
and we connect them explicitly to metaphor and to the cognitive basis for using
language-based tools. Disciplines and practices are frequently if not necessarily
grounded in space and time, and equally frequently they are organized around
objects and other things.204 This perspective, like the four previously reviewed, is
not perfectly independent of any other. But social practices do have power in
themselves, not merely by virtue of the stories we tell about them, or that their
members tells about themselves, and they are sources of norms and sources of
commitment that the law can borrow to articulate relational understandings of
property interests more robust.
IV. CONCLUSION
What we have tried to do in this Comment is give a sense of the variety of
approaches and tools that both practitioners and theorists of the law might explore in
tackling some of the difficult issues of property and related theory that Margaret
Radin points to. The relational approach to those problems can be more effectively
analyzed if we embrace, rather than exclude, metaphorical, conceptual, and
experiential methods. We have suggested some of those methods here. There are
others, and there are blends and refinements to what we have presented.
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We close with a final observation. Perhaps a more effective metaphor for the
whole analysis is not a neighborhood in the context of a city, as Radin suggests, but a
network. Rather than drawing a suitable balance in terms of the salience and the
permeability of boundaries between disciplines and between doctrinal signposts
within disciplines, perhaps we should think of law as a network to be interpreted.205
The notion of a network preserves a relational, metaphoric dynamism and also
permits positive objectification. The task is to know where and when and how to
identify nodes in the network, and to articulate connections and dependencies
between and among them. The task is also to understand that these nodes and
connections are constructs that can and perhaps should change. The hermeneutic
task here might be compared to that of an architect or designer trying to bring sense
to the signs that the human world presents.206 What Radin brings and has brought to
property law and to legal theory in general is an unfailing embrace of the multiplicity
of disciplines that bear on particular problems. What we want to do here is celebrate
this facet of her work, and suggest how to advance her critique a bit beyond even
where she has taken it so far. We hope that the methods we suggest, taken in tandem
with Radin’s observations about the dynamism of our culture and economy, offer
some thought-provoking and potentially useful avenues for research and application.
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